INTRODUCTION Kurt T. Lash's excellent new book, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship,
1 argues that the Fourteenth Amendment's "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" 2 are those personal rights textually enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution, mainly in the Bill of Rights, but some are elsewhere, like the habeas rights of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 3 or the comity rights of Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1. 4 "Incorporation" has become the shorthand term for the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply rights like those in the Bill of Rights, against the states. Lash, however, prefers to refer to his view in terms of "enumerated rights," rather than "incorporation," which he takes to suggest an exclusive association with the Bill of Rights, rather than habeas and comity rights
The 1868 understanding of enumerated rights, not what they expressed in 1788 or 1791, is what matters for Lash. 11 Moreover, on Lash's reading, 1868 is critical not just for states but for Congress as well. 12 The Privileges or Immunities Clause functions, on Lash's reading, as a sort of rebooting of the entire Bill of Rights so that we should interpret the words "freedom of speech," either as a restriction on Congress or as a restriction on states based on what those words expressed in 1868, not 1791.
13
5 LASH, supra note 1, at vii-xv. 6 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (" [T] he words 'No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States' seem to me an eminently reasonable way of expressing the idea that henceforth the Bill of Rights shall apply to the States." (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2)). 10 For my contrarian view that the Fourteenth Amendment actually became law on February 12, 1867, when three-fourths of the states represented in Congress had ratified it, see Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the Northern-Authored Fourteenth Amendment: Reconstruction History (Aug. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn .com/abstract=2317471.
11 LASH, supra note 1, at 296 ("[W]e should be asking whether the claimed right was understood to be a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States in 1868."). 12 Id. at 295 (By enacting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people entrenched their understanding of the rights of national citizenship and, in so doing, reconfigured the meaning and scope of the Original Bill of Rights."). 13 Id. at 290-96.
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I am not a neutral observer of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. My own book on the Clause reads it to forbid states to shorten the rights of citizens of the United States relative to similarly situated fellow citizens, either in the same state or in other states.
14 The same-state component would reproduce much current equality law (allowing the Equal Protection Clause to focus on literal "protection of the laws," as I advocate);
15 the other-states component would guard fundamental rights against outliers from the American tradition of civil liberty, thus producing incorporation of most privileges in the Bill of Rights in virtue of their prevalence in that tradition but not necessarily in the precise form they bind Congress.
Despite our disagreements, Lash and I have a great deal in common. We both seek what the constitutional text expressed to reasonable observers at its enactment, and we both advocate the reinvigoration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to do (some of) the work accomplished today by substantive due process. 16 We agree that the restrictive language of the text-"of citizens of the United States"-is far more important to the Privileges or Immunities Clause than are the mere terms "privileges" and "immunities," and thus that provisions like the Louisiana Cession's promise of the "rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States" are textually closer to the Privileges or Immunities Clause than is the text of the Comity Clause. 17 We agree that the Privileges or Immunities Clause goes beyond comity but does not go so far as to constitutionalize natural rights as such. 18 Lash's argument defies easy summary; his case is cumulative. Lash commendably does not claim that he can reconcile all the relevant evidence to support his thesis, but seeks only the most prevalent patterns of usage. Much evidence he unearths is new; his creative readings of old evidence are generally able to dislodge at least some of my prior confidence in contrary readings. He hits many controversies:
1. Lash presents a large volume of evidence demonstrating the close relation of "privileges" and "immunities" to concepts like "rights" or "advantages." 19 Lash is therefore right to focus on the precise restrictive language used, i.e. Remaining sections of this Article tackle each of these problems.
I. 1791 V. 1868
One major issue with rooting Fourteenth Amendment privileges in the enumerations elsewhere in the Constitution, and particularly in the list of personal rights in the 33 Id. at 236-41 (discussing H.R. REP. NO. 41-22 (1871)). 34 See infra Part I. 35 See infra Part II. 36 See infra Part III.A. 37 See infra Part IV. 38 See infra Part V. 39 See infra Part VI.
Bill of Rights, is the existence of important differences between the contexts of the Founding and Reconstruction. The rights in the Bill of Rights were crafted and selected in a very different setting than the one confronting Congress and the freedmen in 1868.
Someone once said that a handsaw is a good thing, but not to shave with 40 :
Using a Bill of Rights designed only to confirm and supplement limited federal power as the chief means of greatly expanding federal power by shielding new citizens of the United States from oppressive states poses a shaving-with-a-handsaw difficulty. The contexts of 1787 and 1791 were very different from that of 1868. The Bill of Rights (and other rights set out in the federal-constitutional text, like the habeas rights of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2) 41 was intended to safeguard citizens against the new federal government of limited powers, and a goal distinct from providing a catalogue of the rights most important against government generally. The Ninth Amendment is a strong hint that the privileges of citizens of the United States are not set out exclusively in the constitutional text. It was made one of the great objections to this Constitution, by the anti-Federalists of the school of Patrick Henry, that this Constitution was a Constitution of powers and not of rights; that it secured no rights to the citizen. The answer of the Federalists was that the rights of the citizens were amply secured by giving to the citizen of one State the rights and privileges of the citizens of any other State; but that was not satisfactory to the anti-Federalists, and they insisted upon the old amendments to the Constitution which bristle all over with the word "rights," and which do secure to the American citizen certain important rights.
But these amendments to the Constitution do not define all the rights of American citizens. They define some of them. The Constitution itself amply secures some of the rights of American citizens, but the ninth amendment expressly provides that-"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
There are certain rights enumerated in these articles of amendment, but they are not all the rights of the American citizen; very far from it. Where do we find the record of those rights? The fourteenth amendment then coming in says:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
What are these privileges and immunities? Are they only those defined in the Constitution, the rights secured by the amendments? Not at all. The great fountain head, the great reservoir of the rights of an American citizen is in the common law, the old charters that were wrenched by our ancestors five hundred years ago and two hundred years ago from English kings. the common law for them, the source from which my friend can draw the inspiration of genius and of eloquence. 45 Federalists warned during ratification that a Bill of Rights seen as a comprehensive list of important rights would provoke a negative inference for other rights and for limited federal power. 46 The Ninth Amendment was a reminder that there were other rights just as important as, or even more important than, those that were textually enumerated. 47 A later constitutional author could, of course, say that "No State shall interfere with any rights hitherto binding only the federal government," but the Ninth Amendment makes it a priori unlikely. This is not to suggest, of course, that the Ninth Amendment is itself incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. That would press the Ninth Amendment beyond its original function. Rather, the Ninth Amendment confirms the special situation of the Founding; the textual enumeration of rights in the Constitution should not be pressed beyond its original function.
Lash's own excellent, earlier Ninth Amendment scholarship, arguing that the Ninth Amendment was chiefly a clarification of the special role of the Bill of Rights in our scheme of limited federal power, confirms the wide gulf between the roles of statements of rights in 1791 and 1868. 48 Because states possess a general legislative power, protection of the rights of freedmen against state oppression required a moreall-encompassing provision than was required against an enumerated-powers-only federal government. 49 Now, for Lash's particular version of the enumerated-rights-only thesis, there is a smaller gulf between the Bill of Rights and the constitutional rights seen as most important during Reconstruction, because he would update the content of the Bill of Rights based on their understanding in 1868. 50 The selection of rights would thus be made based on the composition of text in 1791, but the content of those rights would be specified in 1868. Congress and the states would, moreover, still be bound by the same rules because this updating would also apply to Congress. Rather than requiring states anachronistically to party like it's 1791, Lash applies a party-likeit's-1868 rule to both federal and state action. 55 The implication, however, is that Congress, as well, is subject not to the 1791 but to the 1868 understandings of the Bill of Rights (and other enumerated rights).
Here is Lash's explanation of this key part of his view:
The Fourteenth Amendment did not simply address the relationship between citizens and the states; it also established one's relationship to the federal government. 55 See LASH, supra note 1, at 294-95. 56 Id. Lash is not entirely alone in this view; Akhil Reed Amar briefly suggested such a view in both his 1992 article and 1998 book on the Bill of Rights, though not as explicitly as Lash. Amar noted that "the Fourteenth Amendment has a doctrinal 'feedback effect' against the federal government, despite the Amendment's clear textual limitation to state action."
Although this move alleviates the gulf between the contexts of the Fourteenth Amendment and that of the original Constitution, Lash's view of 1868 as a rebooting of the Bill of Rights is both devoid of historical support during Reconstruction and destructive of originalism with respect to the Bill of Rights.
It would perhaps be odd to bind states to 1791 understandings of free speech, the right to keep and bear arms, and so on, but this is simply the result of adding the enumerated-rights-only view to originalism about the original Bill of Rights. The enumerated-rights-only view limits the Privileges or Immunities Clause's restraint on states to words chosen in 1791 (and some words chosen earlier); it would be natural for an originalist to then claim that states are only bound by meanings expressed by those words in 1791. Lash's solution, however, abandons Bill-of-Rights originalism in the name of Fourteenth-Amendment originalism.
This is a Bill-of-Rights non-originalism, moreover, of a very odd sort; we are to understand constitutional text like "the freedom of speech" neither by what those words expressed in 1791 (as would most originalists), nor by what they express today (as would Alexander Meiklejohn), 57 nor by what they correspond to in moral reality (as would Ronald Dworkin), 58 nor by what they express throughout history (as would Jed Rubenfeld). 59 I know of no one in 1868 (or any other time prior to Akhil Amar) who thought that the Fourteenth Amendment reauthored the Bill of Rights as a restriction on Congress. This does not, of course, necessarily mean the view is wrong, but the complete lack of historical support, in a book executed with such admirable attention to historical detail, is striking.
II. A SHORT ARGUMENT ABOUT "ABRIDGE": THE SET OF FEDERALLY ENUMERATED RIGHTS CANNOT BE SHORTENED
A second very simple argument can be presented quickly but deserves the attention of those who care chiefly about our precise constitutional text. The "which shall abridge" language of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is in tension with the enumerated-rights-only position because the set of rights set out in the Constitution is not susceptible to abridgement by state action. 60 "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." 61 If "abridge" means simply "shorten," which 1868 dictionaries suggest it [Vol. 24:93 did, 62 then the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" set must be something states can, in principle, shorten. But a state cannot shorten the Bill of Rights itself (or the set including other federally enumerated rights). The word "abridge" in the Privileges or Immunities Clause requires a direct causal chain between the threatened state action and the protected class of rights. 63 By their nature, federally enumerated rights cannot stand in such a causal chain.
III. PARALLELS WITH ARTICLE IV, SECTION 2, CLAUSE 1
A third cluster of arguments concerns not the enumerated-rights thesis itself, but Lash's particular argument for it, which relies heavily on a sharp contrast between the language of the Comity Clause 64 and the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 65 Lash does not consider a possible way to parse the grammar of the Comity Clause that puts it on a much closer parallel with the Privileges or Immunities Clause and does not deal adequately with two very important pieces of evidence-from John Bingham in January 1867 66 and Jacob Howard in February 1869 67 -that link the underlying privileges of the two provisions.
A. The Ambiguity of "[I ]n"
Lash distinguishes too sharply between "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" 68 and the Comity Clause's "privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States," 69 a phrase Lash uses many times in isolation. 70 He comments, "Although both clauses speak of 'privileges' and 'immunities,' they use very different language when referring to the groups whose rights are being protected: 'citizens
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in the several states' versus 'citizens of the United States.'" 71 It is not perfectly clear, however, that "Citizens in the several States" from the Comity Clause defines the set of protected rights, or protected citizens, because it is not clear that "in the several States" modifies "Citizens" at all. 72 Lash's use of the isolated phrase "citizens in the several states" makes a controversial grammatical choice about how to read Article IV. If "in the several states" can refer adverbially to the manner in which privileges are to be enjoyed by visitors, rather than adjectivally to the set of privileges, then the use of the isolated phrase "citizens in the several states," or "privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states," is improper.
Recall the text of the Comity Clause: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
73 Reading "in the several States" adverbially-that is, as modifying "shall be entitled," rather than adjectivally as modifying "Privileges and Immunities" or "Citizens"-makes the Comity Clause a general guarantee of the "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens," a formulation of which Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause is a specification. "[I]n the several States" says, on this reading, where the citizens of each State are to have their entitlement, not where citizens or privileges are located.
Both the Comity Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment concern the privileges and immunities of citizens. 74 The Fourteenth Amendment is more specific-the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States-but if we assign "in the several States" to "shall be entitled," the set of privileges covered by the Fourteenth Amendment language, and that of the Comity Clause, can be made consistent.
The way to make the sets of covered privileges in the Comity Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment identical would be to construe the general phrase "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens" in the Comity Clause to have an implicit restriction like "of the United States." Indeed, as Lash notes, many Republicans (and others) made exactly this interpolation as they interpreted the Comity Clause; it was called the "ellipsis theory" of the Comity Clause. 75 Thus, while Lash is right that the Fourteenth Amendment text is more analogous to treaty provisions using "of citizens of the United States" to restrict the rights at issue explicitly than the Fourteenth Amendment text is to the bare text of the Comity Clause, 76 more than the bare text of the Comity Clause was in view at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The Comity Clause construed with the ellipsis theory and an adverbial rather than adjectival "in the several States" replicates the restrictive "of citizens of the United States," which Lash rightly sees as central to the meaning expressed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Moreover, two very strong pieces of evidence link the Comity Clause with the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, one which Lash explains inadequately in his book and another which Lash neglects entirely.
Bingham in January 1867
Lash's explanation of John Bingham's January 1867 reiteration of the "ellipsis theory" of the Comity Clause, 78 applying the phrase "Privileges and Immunities of citizens of the United States" to rates of taxation, falls short. 79 Discussing the admission of Nebraska, Bingham explained why congressional restrictions on new states were generally inappropriate, despite some contrary precedents. 80 These precedents, Bingham explained, merely enforced the Comity Clause:
It is urged also that States have been admitted upon the condition that non-resident citizens of the United States should be subject to no other or higher rate of tax than resident citizens or be denied the immunities or privileges of citizens therein. But this is simply a carrying out of that provision of the Constitution which declares that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens" [of the United States] (supplying the ellipsis) "in the several States." 81 Lash (after admirably setting out this quotation in full) says that Bingham's use of the ellipsis theory simply indicated that respecting interstate comity would make citizens of different states also citizens of the United States. 82 But the importance is much greater: during the key ratification moment of the Fourteenth Amendment-the month in which most of the North would ratify 83 -Bingham used the phrase "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States" to refer to rights clearly outside the Bill of Rights (or elsewhere in the Constitution). 84 Bingham cannot in this context be using the phrase "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States" to refer to the Comity Clause rights themselves because that would make the provision into a fractal. The Comity Clause requires comity with respect to the 78 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 450 (1867). 79 LASH, supra note 1, at 167 n.399. 80 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 449-50 (1867). 81 Id. at 450. 82 LASH, supra note 1, at 167 n.399 (alteration in original). 83 See Green, supra note 10, at 11 n.13. 84 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 450 (1867).
privileges of citizens of the United States, not merely comity as a privilege of citizens of the United States. Rather, on Bingham's reading, state law which subjected its citizens to certain rates of taxation, and thus privileged them against any higher rates, had to apply to citizens of other states as well under the Comity Clause.
85
These underlying tax rates, and not merely the comity requirement, were encompassed within the phrase "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States" for Bingham. 86 To reiterate: the rate of taxation prevalent in a state was, for Bingham, a privilege of citizens of the United States to which other visiting citizens of the United States were entitled. Plainly, "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States" did not mean, for Bingham in 1867, "privileges enumerated in the federal constitution."
Howard in February 1869
Lash's book also fails to consider Jacob Howard's 1869 explanation for the lack of voting rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause in terms of the lack of voting rights under the Comity Clause. 87 Howard explained:
The occasion of introducing the first section of the fourteenth article of amendment into that amendment grew out of the fact that there was nothing in the whole Constitution to secure absolutely the citizens of the United States in the various States against an infringement of their rights and privileges under the second section of the fourth article of the old Constitution. That section declares that-"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States."
There it was plainly written down. Now, sir, it seems to me, that unless the Senator from Vermont and the Senator from Massachusetts can derive the right of voting from this ancient second section of the fourth article upon the ground that the citizens of each State are entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States, they must give up the argument; and I assert here with confidence that no such construction was ever given to the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution. Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution. To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be-for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature-to these should be added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution . . . .
93
He then paraphrased most of the Bill of Rights.
94
The key here is Howard's "to these should be added." The usual way of reading Howard at this point is that he intended to deploy the Corfield standard out of its context of mere comity and use it as the standard for nationalized rights of citizens of the United States-even citizens who stay home. 95 The rights in On Lash's reading, Howard is doing no such thing. 97 Rather than using the Corfield criterion and saying that rights in the Bill of Rights should be "added" to Justice Washington's list as an additional application, Lash takes Howard to be doing the opposite-the general criterion is instead "textually enumerated rights," a category under which both the comity rights of Article IV and the rights in the Bill of Rights fall. 98 Even on its own terms, it is hard for me to read Howard's 1866 speech to be using Corfield merely as an instance of the broader, basic category "textually enumerated rights," rather than as setting out, itself, the basic definitional category for the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Whatever ambiguity Lash may find in 1866, however, Howard made his non-enumerated-rights-only attitude toward the Comity Clause-Fourteenth Amendment relationship crystal clear in 1869. 99 Lash has argued that Howard's 1869 comments merely reflect, like his 1866 introduction, the idea that comity is (because of its inclusion in Article IV) one enumerated right among many. 100 This interpretation does not fit the argumentative context. Howard is not saying that the comity rights of Article IV are part of those included in the Fourteenth Amendment; Howard is saying that because voting rights are not included in Article IV, they are thus not included in the Fourteenth Amendment.
For what it is worth, in his other work on a variety of issues during the Civil War and Reconstruction, such as Fourteenth Amendment legitimacy and presidential power, Howard gives every impression of being a candid speaker and clear State against the creation of monopolies in favor of citizens of other States, the fourteenth amendment does for the protection of every citizen of the United States against the creation of any monopoly whatever."). 96 The reading here is that later given in 1871 in United States v. Bingham and Howard both give us good reason to anchor our interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause in Article IV in some way. There are, however, many different ways this might be done. Philip Hamburger gives the narrowest possibility: seeing the Fourteenth Amendment itself as merely a tweak on interstate comity. 104 This would, of course, not have done much for the freedmen. Two other possibilities are: (1) to take the equality-for-visitors comity idea and transform it into equality for everyone, even citizens of the United States who stay home; or (2) to take the rights covered by the Comity Clause and protect them absolutely for all citizens of the United States, whether or not fellow citizens receive those rights. As we will see, a great deal of evidence favors the broader-sort-ofequality transformation of Article IV; a reasonable amount of evidence also suggests that the Privileges or Immunities Clause also protects basic rights. My book explains why I take the basic-rights aspect of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to be the expression of an equality requirement-equality among citizens of the United States even if they live in different states-but for the purposes of evaluating the enumeratedrights-only interpretation, the equality evidence is more important.
105

IV. EQUALITY
This Article's first three criticisms of Lash's version of the enumerated-rights-only thesis-the 1791 and 1868 gulf, the problem with "abridge," and the closer relationship between Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment than Lash acknowledgeshave stayed largely above the fray of significant historical dredging. However, the most persuasive reasons to reject the enumerated-rights-only reading depend on seeing just how weighty contrary interpretations are, a task which will require more dirt
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under our fingernails. This section will consider equality among similarly situated citizens of the United States, both as an interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause itself and as an interpretation of non-Article IV precursors, which Lash rightly sees as strongly parallel to the Fourteenth Amendment. This Part considers two sorts of evidence which, on Lash's principles, he should take particularly seriously: evidence from the treaty provisions like the Louisiana Cession of 1803 and evidence from the 1866 public debate. Part VI will discuss subsequent-interpretation equality evidence preceding the Civil Rights Act of 1875, of which there is an enormous amount. But first let's talk about treaties and 1866.
A. Treaties
One of the very important contributions from Kurt Lash's scholarship on the Privileges or Immunities Clause has been his focus on provisions like the 1803 promise to Napoleon to supply the "rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States" to those in the Louisiana Territory. 106 Restrictive interpretations of this language, limiting it to rights set out in the federal Constitution, were made by Daniel Webster and his allies in rebutting the Southern-Democratic argument that it encompassed Missourians's right to legalize slavery.
107
I agree with Lash that the terms "privileges" and "immunities" were themselves not sharply distinguished from each other, or from terms like "rights" or "advantages," in the context of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The restrictive phrase "of citizens of the United States" was critical in the Fourteenth Amendment, and treaties which use the same restrictive phrase were therefore a more precise textual background for the Privileges or Immunities Clause than was Article IV. As explained above, however, Article IV, as glossed, used the same restrictive language as the Fourteenth Amendment.
108
There was a great deal of evidence, however, which Lash does not confront, that the 1803 promise of the rights of citizens of the United States was understood as a promise of the rights of other similarly situated citizens of the United States. 109 It was a promise that the new citizens of the Louisiana Territory would not become second-class citizens. This interpretation fits the context of Reconstruction perfectly: it was chiefly a promise that new citizens-the freedmen-would not become second-class citizens.
Jefferson's correspondence with his Attorney General Levy Lincoln during the summer of 1803-secret at the time, but published after Jefferson's death in 1826-gives powerful support to this interpretation. 110 The treaty with France was signed on April 30, 1803, and the Senate had not yet ratified it. 111 Jefferson worried that the acquisition of territory required a constitutional amendment and thought about the language which would have accomplished such acquisition in the way that the deal with France contemplated. 112 Jefferson proposed this language: "Louisiana, as ceded by France to the United States, is made a part of the United States; its white inhabitants shall be citizens, and stand, as to their rights and obligations, on the same footing with other citizens of the United States, in analogous situations." 113 This was obviously Jefferson's understanding of the status of the inhabitants of Louisiana. Jefferson proposed it as a way to give proper constitutional support, in case of widespread congressional scruples, to the promises already made to (white) Louisianans; it was not a proposal to go beyond the existing treaty.
The negotiating history of the rights-advantages-and-immunities provision likewise reflects a focus on equal citizenship. Then-Secretary of State James Madison wrote on March 2, 1803, to Robert Livingston and James Monroe, who were negotiating the treaty:
To incorporate the inhabitants of the hereby ceded territory with the citizens of the United States on an equal footing, being a provision, which cannot now be made, it is to be expected, from the character and policy of the United States, that such incorporation will take place without unnecessary delay. In the meantime they shall be secure in their persons and property, and in the free enjoyment of their religion. 111 See generally Louisiana Purchase Treaty, supra note 25, at 200. Article III reads, "The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess. 
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the language which became the promise of (eventual) "rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States." 115 Both were placed alongside temporary promises of security for property and religion until full rights of citizenship were possible.
Louisiana cases interpreting the cession applied it to the right to be a lawyer 116 and statutory rights relating to alienage disabilities. 117 Both contradict Webster's constitutional-rights-only construction.
Webster's argument was one of those made in defense of congressional power to impose restrictions on new states. However, there were others who construed the cession as a guarantee of equality with other citizens of the United States but defended restrictions as even-handed. 118 They also argued both that the promise was limited to those in Louisiana in 1803 or to areas inhabited in 1803, and that Congress could override treaties.
119
For instance, this is Senator James Burrill's 1820 defense of restrictions on Missouri:
The true meaning of the clause must be, that the inhabitants shall be put on the same footing as other citizens of the United States, to their political rights, and to the same extent as if native-born, and the provision extends only to those who were inhabitants, and is the common provision when territory is ceded either after a conquest, or otherwise; and cannot refer to persons already citizens of the United States who buy land and remove thither; such require no aid from the treaty. 123 The "advantages of American citizens" were not, for Marshall, limited to the advantages set out textually in the Constitution, but were the advantages enjoyed in common with citizens of the United States elsewhere in the Union. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo's similar provision 124 was said in 1849 to put "the Mexicans upon an equality with the citizens of the United States according to the principles of the Constitution." 125 The Louisiana, 126 Florida, 127 and Mexico   128 provisions, all of which affected many Catholics, 129 were invoked against anti-Catholic discrimination in 1855. 130 President Franklin Pierce's December 1856 message to Congress described the Louisiana Cession as "a right to pass into the condition of States on a footing of perfect equality with the original States." 131 134 in response, Benjamin Curtis and John McLean's dissents relied on the arguments that the cession was limited to those in Louisiana in 1803 and that Congress could override a treaty but without making Webster's arguments. 135 It is true that Catron relied chiefly on the interim provisions regarding the preservation of property until statehood, but slave-owners' rights to participate equally in constitution-making in Kansas and Nebraska, even before statehood, were taken by President Pierce and his fellow-travelers as covered by the "rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States" language. 136 There was no sharp line between the maintenance-of-liberty-property-and-religion phase of territorial life under the cession and the rights-advantages-and-immunities phase. Webster's argument, if it were current, would have been à propos, but McLean and Curtis did not make it.
Finally on the treaty issue, one 1866 observer noted, shortly after its proposal, the Privileges or Immunities Clause's (and the Civil Rights Act of 1866's) similarity to the analogous Florida provision, which gave some Creoles in the Mobile area American citizenship-and continued equal citizenship-in 1819. 137 John Forsyth of the Mobile Advertiser wrote:
These people although of African and mixed blood, were citizens under the Spanish government, on an equal footing, in all respects, with other citizens. The treaty of 1819, by which this portion of Alabama (with Florida) was ceded to the United States, expressly guaranteed to them a continuance of the privilege of citizenship. They have actually been citizens of Alabama and Florida for nearly half a century. 138 
B. 1866 Public Discussion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
Turning to 1866 public discussion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, a great deal of it described the Clause in terms of equality-not just interstate comity, but freedom from the Black Codes for freedmen remaining in their home states.
One of the sources which Lash himself cites repeatedly, the Cincinnati Commercial's collection, Speeches of the Campaign of 1866, 139 includes many examples in which the Privileges or Immunities Clause was described in terms of equality: Lyman Trumbull did so on August 2, 140 Robert Schenck on August 18, 141 James Garfield on August 22, 142 Benjamin Butler on August 25, 143 Columbus Delano on August 28, [Vol. 24:93
Stevens on September 4, 147 Robert Ingersol on September 10, 148 Benjamin Wade on September 11, 149 Nathaniel Banks on September 27, 150 Benjamin Butler again on October 2, 151 Clement Vallandigham on October 4, 152 William Dennison on October 6, 153 and Zachariah Chandler on October 22. 154 I stress that these are all descriptions of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not merely Section One as a whole, in terms of equality. They are also not descriptions of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in terms of comity, but equal treatment of citizens in their home states. The Cincinnati Commercial's collection can serve as an excellent time machine for those wishing to get a first-hand feel for the public discussions during 1866. Truth be told, I had not encountered it before reading Lash's book, but carefully reading the collection greatly bolstered my confidence in an equality-based reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Lash quotes several of these descriptions, particularly Benjamin Butler's insistence that "every citizen of the United States should have equal rights with every other citizen of the United States, in every State." 155 Lash notes that "a promise of 'equal rights' was a common theme." 156 Indeed it was. Another excellent collection of evidence, though it is limited to Southern sources, appears in James E. Bond rendered ambiguous in light of President Johnson's objection that, by conferring the status of citizenship on freedmen, the Act had not only granted certain equal rights, but had also necessarily conferred all the substantive rights of citizens of the United States. The same was true of speeches that described the Clause as guaranteeing equal rights of citizens in the states, since both nationalizing the Bill of Rights and enforcing the Comity Clause would have had that effect.
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I find these comments opaque. Why exactly would nationalizing the Bill of Rights guarantee equal rights for all citizens? The sort of equality at stake in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was clear: it was equality with respect to rights, like the right to contract, which were both (a) outside the Bill of Rights, and (b) to be enjoyed even by citizens staying home, unconcerned with comity. Lash's explanation here is mysterious. Lash's later summary-"there is nothing in the historical record that contradicts Jacob Howard's description of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting constitutionally enumerated rights"
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-conflicts with the evidence he presents himself earlier in the chapter, at least if this sentence means to refer to Lash's reading of Howard as contending that the Privileges or Immunities Clause covers only rights enumerated elsewhere. Perhaps Lash means only that there is no evidence that specifically said that an enumerated right was excluded. I will concede that, but Lash himself produces a great deal of evidence that the Privileges or Immunities Clause goes beyond rights enumerated in the Constitution.
Finally, when Lash assesses other views of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in his conclusion, 176 he does not devote any argumentative space to the rebuttal of an equal-citizenship view. At this key point, he lumps John Harrison's equal-citizenship and Philip Hamburger's comity readings without answering Harrison's much stronger view. 177 Lash's arguments against Hamburger are, to my mind, quite compelling, but he makes no arguments specifically against Harrison. His trichotomy between comity, enumerated-rights-only, and common-law-federalization positions is too impoverished because it neglects an interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in terms of equality for citizens in their home states.
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
To his credit, Lash We passed a Bill on the ninth of April last, over the President's veto, known as the Civil Rights Bill, that specifically and directly declares what the rights of a citizen of the United States are-that they may make and enforce contracts, sue and be parties, give evidence, purchase, lease, and sell property, and be subject to like punishments. That is the last law on the subject. Prior to the actual framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, the discussion of the Civil Rights Act itself was conducted in terms of the privileges of citizens of the United States. The two sponsors, the chairmen of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees-James Falconer Wilson and Lyman Trumbull-were very explicit. Wilson said on March 9, 1866, "[T]his bill refers to those rights which belong to men as citizens of the United States and none other . . . ." 188 At the time, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 draft included references to "civil rights and immunities," but also named several non-constitutionally enumerated rights explicitly. 189 Lash's understanding of the rights of citizens of the United States: Wilson's view that the rights in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were rights of citizens of the United States clearly contradicts the enumerated-rights-only view of the rights of citizens of the United States. That poses a much bigger problem for the enumerated-rightsonly view, however, than for Wilson.
Lash insists, however, on claiming Wilson and Trumbull as allies: "In seeking to secure the needed votes, proponents like Trumbull and Wilson narrowed their definition of the rights of American citizenship to rights expressly enumerated in the Bill of Rights."
198 Reviewing these two speeches, this interpretation does not seem right at all. They didn't narrow the Civil Rights Act itself to enumerated rights-it still covered the right to contract, testify, own land, and so on. 199 Lash reads Trumbull as invoking on this page "the Fifth Amendment as a textual hook for the Act," and Wilson as making a "similar move. 201 This is important because, on my view, the "protection of the laws," to which the Equal Protection Clause is limited, cannot cover all of the rights in the Civil Rights Act; it clearly did not encompass the right to own land, uncontroversially denied to aliens. Unless Lash adopts a contrary view of the Equal Protection Clause, he must not only disagree with Colfax, Trumbull, Stevens, Wilson, and many others who explicitly explained the Civil Rights Act in terms of the rights of citizens of the United States, but also do without Civil Rights Act of 1866 constitutionalization at all. It is, of course, quite enough for one book to focus on the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but, if Lash is presupposing a contrary view of the Equal Protection Clause, he is doing so without adequate explanation or defense.
V. 1866
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was, of course, a central player in the public discussion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and it could not be sustained on an enumerated-rights-only interpretation. Two other aspects of the 1866 debate spell other trouble for the view: (a) Republican explanations of the lack of voting rights that overlook the argument which would be obvious under the enumerated-rights-only 
A. The Lack of Voting Rights
The Democrats's most common objection to the Privileges or Immunities Clause was that it would confer voting rights; Republicans insisted repeatedly that women and children were citizens yet not voters, and thus that "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" did not include voting rights. 202 A trip in the Cincinnati Commercial, Bond, and McPherson time machines will make this very clear. Among Cincinnati Commercial evidence, the Democratic voting-rights charge was made by Thomas Hendricks on August 8, 203 by a "Dr. Snow" on August 25, 204 and by Thomas Bartley on September 29. 205 Of course, neither John Bingham, nor Jacob Howard, nor Schuyler Colfax were the authors, constitutionally speaking, of the Fourteenth Amendment. The actual author was a collection of people in Congress and ratifying conventions who acted collectively only through the text of the Amendment itself. 290 To the extent that a Reconstructor attached idiosyncratic meanings to that text, he was on a frolic of his own, not acting on behalf of the actual constitutional author. In assessing the weight appropriate for explanations of meaning and assessments of constitutional application, it therefore seems reasonable to use the factors pertinent to Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
291 deference: "The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."
292 Consistency between 1866 and 1871 (or 1869 or 1872 or 1875), as well as the relative cogency and thoroughness of textual reasoning, are interpretively quite important.
If nothing else, the large number of equality-based explanations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1875 can bolster equality-based explanations of the clause given in 1866. The situation might be different if equality interpretations were completely unknown in 1866 and popped into existence fullblown from the brow of Charles Sumner in January 1872. But they did not.
B. Subsequent-Interpretation Equality Evidence
I devote a substantial appendix in my book 293 to a collection of the many bits of evidence explaining the Privileges-or-Immunities-Clause basis for the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The serious stream of such evidence began in January 1872, when Charles Sumner began attempting to attach a civil rights provision to Fourteenth Amendment, Section Three amnesty legislation. 294 Republicans explained over and over and over that, under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, all similarly situated U.S. citizens must receive the same privileges: common-carrier, schooling, and jury rights were rights of citizens of the United States that states could not grant in a racially discriminatory manner.
Here, I will simply list the Republicans offering such interpretations most clearly with a citation to a representative speech for each: 290 Phillips, 329 William Purman, 330 Joseph Rainey, 331 Alonzo Ransier, 332 James Rapier, 333 Ellis H. Roberts, 334 William Stowell, 335 Lyman Tremain, 336 Josiah Walls, 337 and Alexander White.
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C. The Enumerated-Rights-Only Reading and the Civil Rights Act of 1875
Because common-carrier and schooling rights are outside the Bill of Rights, the enumerated-rights-only reading undermines the dominant argument for Republican proposals for the desegregation of schools and common carriers in (drafts of) the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Indeed, Democrat Allen Thurman adopted the enumeratedrights-only view on February 6, 1872, for precisely this purpose. 339 We can date Thurman's adoption of the enumerated-rights-only view with some precision-and significantly undermine his credibility-because on January 23, exactly two weeks before, Thurman stated that the Privileges or Immunities Clause applied to the textually unenumerated right to testify. 340 Democrats like James Beck, 341 Eppa Hunton, 342 Roger Mills, 343 Milton Southard, 344 and Thomas Norwood 345 echoed Thurman's enumerated-rights-only interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause for the same anti-Civil-Rights-Act-of-1875 purpose.
In turning away a constitutional challenge to segregated schools-the same constitutional claim underlying versions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 covering education-the Ohio Supreme Court (of which Thurman had years earlier been the chief justice) also followed Thurman's interpretation, though with some hesitation, in May 1872 in Garnes. 346 The date is important: Lash lists the case as decided in 1871, matching the December 1871 term of court, but newspaper accounts from May 8, 1872, refer to the case as decided the previous day. 347 The causal arrow runs from Thurman to Garnes, not the other way.
